Religiozni simboli v javnih solah kot poucne kontroverze v religijskem izobrazevanju by Moe, Christian
Moe, Christian
Religious symbols in public schools as teachable controversies in religious
education
CEPS Journal 9 (2019) 4, S. 91-108
Empfohlene Zitierung/ Suggested Citation:
Moe, Christian: Religious symbols in public schools as teachable controversies in religious education -
In: CEPS Journal 9 (2019) 4, S. 91-108 - URN: urn:nbn:de:0111-pedocs-188669 - DOI:
10.26529/cepsj.693
http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0111-pedocs-188669
http://dx.doi.org/10.26529/cepsj.693
in Kooperation mit / in cooperation with:
http://www.pef.uni-lj.si
Nutzungsbedingungen Terms of use
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und
beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist
ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch
bestimmt. Die Nutzung stellt keine Übertragung des Eigentumsrechts an
diesem Dokument dar und gilt vorbehaltlich der folgenden Einschränkungen:
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz
beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise
abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder
kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen,
vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to
using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. Use
of this document does not include any transfer of property rights and it is
conditional to the following limitations: All of the copies of this documents must
retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for
public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform,
distribute or otherwise use the document in public.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of
use.
Kontakt / Contact:
peDOCS
DIPF | Leibniz-Institut für Bildungsforschung und Bildungsinformation
Informationszentrum (IZ) Bildung
E-Mail: pedocs@dipf.de
Internet: www.pedocs.de
c e p s  Journal | Vol.9 | No4 | Year 2019 91
Religious Symbols in Public Schools as Teachable 
Controversies in Religious Education
Christian Moe1 
• This focus issue of CEPS Journal raises two topics usually treated separate-
ly, Religious Education and the use of religious symbols in public schools. 
Both involve the challenge of applying liberal democratic principles of 
secularism and pluralism in a school setting and refract policies on re-
ligion under conditions of globalisation, modernisation and migration. I 
take this situation as a teachable moment and argue that it illustrates the 
potential of a particular kind of Religious Education, based on the sci-
entific Study of Religion, for making sense of current debates in Europe, 
including the debate on religious education itself. However, this requires 
maintaining a spirit of free, unbiased comparative enquiry that may clash 
with political attempts to instrumentalise the subject as a means of inte-
grating minority students into a value system.
 Keywords: religious education, religious symbols, public schools, 
secularism
1 Ljubljana, Slovenia; mail@christianmoe.com.
doi: 10.26529/cepsj.693
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Religiozni simboli v javnih šolah kot poučne 
kontroverze v religijskem izobraževanju
Christian Moe
• Tematska številka revije CEPS izpostavlja dve temi, ki se običajno 
obravnavata ločeno – pouk o religijah in uporaba religijskih simbolov 
v javni šoli. Obe zaznamuje izziv apliciranja liberalnodemokratičnih 
načel sekularizma in pluralizma v šolskem okolju, skozi obe se tudi lo-
mijo politike glede religije v razmerah globalizacije, modernizacije in 
migracij. Takšne razmere predstavim kot priložnost za poučevanje in 
argumentiram, da ilustrira potencial specifičnega, na religiologiji ute-
meljenega predmeta o religijah, za osmišljanje trenutnih razprav v Evro-
pi, vključno z razpravami o pouku o religijah. To pa zahteva ohranjanje 
duha svobodnega, nepristranskega primerjalnega raziskovanja, ki lahko 
trči ob politične poskuse instrumentalizacije predmeta kot sredstva in-
tegracije učencev iz manjšinskih skupnosti v sistem vrednot.
 Ključne besede: religijsko izobraževanje, religiozni simboli, javne šole, 
sekularizem
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Introduction 
This special issue of CEPS Journal raises two topics, Religious Education 
(RE) and religious symbols in public schools, which are usually treated sepa-
rately, by different disciplines – respectively, those concerned with religion and 
teaching, and those concerned with law and public policy. Still, the two topics 
are linked in at least two ways.
First, both are concerned with the challenge of applying liberal demo-
cratic principles of secularism and pluralism in the public institutions of socie-
ties increasingly characterised by a plurality of religions and world-views. The 
school is a microcosm of the broader problems of multicultural coexistence and 
a subject of political contention. School policy on these issues is thus a helpful 
prism through which we can see refracted current European policies on reli-
gion and discern a spectrum of ideological positions.2
Second, both issues have taken on increasing salience in Europe in re-
cent decades due to the perceived role of religion in problems with integrat-
ing immigrant minorities; the ‘securitisation’ of religion, especially Islam; and 
the rise of political movements that privilege native identities and reject liberal 
principles in a defensive reaction to globalisation, modernisation, and migra-
tion.3 A perceived need to integrate new (especially Muslim) minorities into 
a national culture of shared values is seen in the turn to ‘civic integration’ of 
immigrants since the 1990s, not only in residence/citizenship requirements but 
also in public schools, including RE (e.g., Fernández & Jensen, 2017). This is to 
be expected, as public schools are society’s main institution of secondary social-
isation and cultural reproduction, and religion is still (despite secularisation) 
widely seen either as a ‘social glue’ or as a source of social discord that must be 
carefully controlled. European institutions have thus become increasingly con-
cerned that intercultural education, including RE, should foster tolerance and 
other liberal values to promote social cohesion and prevent religious conflict 
(Committee of Ministers, 2008; Faas, Hajisoteriou, & Angelides, 2014; OSCE/
ODIHR, 2007; PACE, 2005; REDCo, 2009). Meanwhile, national authorities 
across Europe have invoked integration into a national culture, conflated with 
Christian religious heritage and/or secular liberal values, to regulate various 
symbolic religious expressions in schools, and in a few cases to introduce new 
2 E.g. the tentative distinction in Kuburić & Moe (2006) between Slovenia’s ‘liberal’ approach to RE, 
Bosnia’s, Croatia’s and Serbia’s ‘multiculturalist’ approach and the ‘communalist’ approach emerg-
ing in Macedonian debates.
3 While most far-right populist parties in Europe have not historically been particularly concerned 
with religion, they have become rhetorical defenders of Christendom through their opposition to 
immigrant Islam (Marzouki, McDonnell, & Roy, 2016).
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teaching standards (Britain) or even new RE subjects (Norway). As discussed 
below, these measures have often been controversial, and some have ended in 
court, producing no less controversial judgements.
In this essay, I take this situation as a teachable moment and ask: How 
can educators respond pedagogically to these controversies as an opportunity to 
teach about religion? Relevant expert recommendations have focused on rights 
and process (Jackson, 2014, chapter 8) more than educational content. I outline 
study questions, discussion topics, and examples for conceptualising the pub-
lic role of religious symbols, with suggestions for specific knowledge aims and 
thinking skills, and argue why the RE framework I consider is suited for mak-
ing sense of these debates.4
The kind of RE considered here is a knowledge subject about religions 
which, like other school subjects, is taught to all pupils regardless of confession 
(‘integrative’ RE) and is rooted in an academic discipline, the scientific study 
of religion (Alberts, 2008, 2010; Jensen, 2008, 2010). A cross-disciplinary field 
that draws on the methods of history, philology, anthropology and sociology, 
the Study of Religion (SR) takes religion as empirically available social and cul-
tural phenomena, studies these phenomena comparatively across cultures and 
over time, and develops concepts and theories to describe, analyse and account 
for them within a naturalistic framework, treating religious/supernatural truth 
claims as data to be explained, rather than as explanations. Like other academic 
disciplines, SR engages in a continuous process of self-critical reflection on 
method and theory, not least on such relevant problems in the present political 
context as the roles of insiders and outsiders (McCutcheon, 1999) and the repre-
sentation of religious others (on textbooks, see, e.g. Andreassen & Lewis, 2014). 
Part of this process is an ongoing debate over what constitutes ‘religion’ 
itself as an object of study. Here, I take as my theoretical starting point a reflec-
tion on SR in the (university) classroom by Martin S. Jaffee, who begins by re-
jecting two influential understandings (religion as psycho-social ‘experience’ or 
phenomenological ‘essence’) in favour of a cultural-systems perspective in which 
religion is understood in a hermeneutic circle between theory and observation. 
Jaffee suggests that research-based teaching of comparative religion offers ‘a cer-
tain sharpening of perception or education of taste’, enabling students to grasp 
the role of religion in historical cultures and individual lives (Jaffee, 1999, p. 279). 
While I think SR offers a bit more than this, an educated taste is in itself a fine 
aim of a liberal education, and it could in time lead to more well-informed public 
debate and policy on religion than we find in the cases discussed below.
4 This is not to suggest, however, that understanding current events should be the primary purpose 
of, or justification for, RE.
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In the first section, I outline salient features of the controversies, focus-
ing on prominent cases in European religious-freedom law as condensed ex-
pressions of public policy and debate: Norway’s RE subject (the Folgerø case) 
and Italy’s classroom crucifixes (the Lautsi case) in conjunction with several 
headscarf cases. I argue that there is a paradox in the authorities’ handling of 
these cases that reveals deficiencies in the public understanding of religion and 
religious symbols. Therefore, I go on to highlight key theoretical concerns, ana-
lytical categories and findings from SR, to outline how SR-based RE can engage 
with the religious-symbols debate. In the concluding discussion, I consider how 
the increasing concern with integration in multi-religious societies represents 
an opportunity to implement integrative SR-based RE, but also a challenge to 
the vision of a subject exploring world-views rather than imparting them.
RE and religious symbols:  
controversies and contradictions
Diverse political dynamics favour RE that seeks to integrate pupils into 
a national identity by inculcating shared values, based on problematic equa-
tions between dominant religious traditions and national communities. Here I 
briefly consider the case of the compulsory integrative RE subject introduced in 
Norway in the 1990s (see also Andreassen, this focus issue).
In Norway, a state with an established church since 1537 (disestablished 
in 2012), elementary-school RE had been a mandatory ‘Christianity’ subject for 
members of the state Lutheran Church; since the 1970s, other children could 
take an alternative ‘Worldviews and Ethics’ class. In the 1990s school reforms, 
both options were replaced by a new mandatory, integrative subject on ‘Chris-
tianity, Religions and Worldviews’. The new subject was not intended to preach 
one faith, but to teach about different religions through a common pedagogy, 
though with a quantitative focus on the majority religion. In effect, it repre-
sented a ‘halfway house’ between Christian religious instruction and a multi-
religious RE subject (Thomassen, 2006, p. 259).
The legislative record5 shows that the new religious diversity and the in-
tegration of immigrants were central concerns motivating the new RE policy, 
which must be understood in terms of the ‘ingrained political desire to use the 
public school system as a tool for creating societal cohesion and national solidar-
ity’ (Thomassen, 2006, p. 258), led by the Labour Party, which was secular but 
5 The official study (Pettersen, 1995), the government’s White Paper (St. meld. nr. 14 [1995–96] Om 
kristendomskunnskap med religions- og livssynsorientering) and the parliamentary committee 
report (Innst. S. nr. 103 [1995–96]).
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comfortable wielding the instrument of state religion. It was argued that success-
ful integration depended on minorities mastering the ‘cultural code’ of Norwe-
gian society by learning about its ‘deep current’ of Christianity. Pupils would also 
learn more about five minority worldviews (Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hindu-
ism, and Humanism), but as ‘other’ and apparently less important religions. 
Ironically, this policy succeeded in fostering dialogue and unity across 
religious lines by bringing minority religions together on a common platform 
for the first time – to protest the new RE subject.6 A group of Humanist par-
ents sued the government all the way to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). It should be kept in mind that the ECtHR, when interpreting the right 
to freedom of opinion and religion and the scope for legitimate restrictions on 
that right (Nowak & Vospernik, 2004), has applied a form of power analysis 
to proselytism and indoctrination. While proselytising for one’s religion is a 
protected exercise of religious freedom, it violates the religious freedom of oth-
ers when the proselytiser holds authority over the proselytised.7 Public schools 
must, therefore, allow exemptions from subjects that are ‘indoctrinating’, in or-
der to prevent the state from infringing on the right of parents to an education 
for their children in accordance with their convictions. However, schools may 
teach compulsory subjects, even if they clash with parents’ convictions, as long 
as the subject is taught in an ‘objective, critical and pluralistic way’.8 In Folgerø 
v. Norway, the court by a 9–8 majority found that Norway had violated the 
parental right (ECtHR, 2007). The judgment turned on the restrictive exemp-
tion regime for the subject, its residual elements of Christian religious practice, 
and a legal framework that required schools to assist parents in the Christian 
upbringing of their children.
The subject has since been revised several times, the law changed, and 
the Church separated from the state. The subject has continued to evolve from 
its Christian-instruction origins, with carefully vetted contents, growing atten-
tion from SR scholars (von der Lippe & Undheim, 2017), and elements of a the-
matic approach, despite the current right-wing government’s policy to devote 
more than half the subject to Christianity. Its troubled history, however, offers 
a cautionary tale about using RE as a tool of integration into ‘national values’. 
6 The Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities in Norway was formed as an umbrella 
organisation for interfaith cooperation in 1996, in connection with protests against the new RE 
subject. As of 2019 it counts 15 member communities and works on a range of issues (https://www.
trooglivssyn.no/english/).
7 Larissis v. Greece (1998), contrast Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993). For discussion see Nowak and 
Vospernik (2004, pp. 160–161).
8 The parental right is set out in the first Optional Protocol to the ECHR, art. 2; the ‘objective, criti-
cal and pluralistic’ test was set out in a Danish case on sex education in 1976, and has recently been 
applied to religious education (ECtHR, 2007, 2011).
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Controversies over religious symbols in public schools in Europe, too, 
have escalated from headmasters’ offices through governments all the way to 
the ECtHR. They have mainly concerned whether Christian crucifixes or cross-
es may be displayed in classrooms and whether Muslim teachers or pupils may 
wear various forms of covering (hijab) including headscarves. Because states 
are required to make non-discriminatory laws, however, attempts to regulate 
these two religions and symbols tend to result in wider impacts, as with the 
French law against ‘ostentatious’ religious attire (Bowen, 2007) that clearly tar-
gets hijabs but also affects Jewish pupils with kippas, Sikhs with turbans and 
Christians with large crosses.  Related issues that can only be mentioned in 
passing here include collective prayers, prayer spaces, exemptions from swim-
ming lessons, and shaking hands with the other sex. As we will see, these are 
somewhat different kinds of symbols, subject to different ritual rules that are 
differently gendered, and used by different kinds of actors. 
When conflicts escalate beyond the individual school, they must be re-
solved according to the abstract, universal, neutrally applicable principles of 
the secular state. This reduces the scope for individual adaptations, flexibility, 
and compromise that exists in face-to-face negotiations in the school setting. 
The ‘thick’ meanings of religious symbols and behaviour are translated into the 
‘thin’ language of the secular legal order, notably into the vocabulary of human 
rights. Much is lost in translation.
Based on the same kind of power analysis used for ‘indoctrinating’ sub-
jects (see above), one might expect the ECtHR to uphold pupils’ religious free-
dom both to wear headscarves and to have classrooms free from crucifixes. 
Crucifixes are, after all, displayed in classrooms by state institutions holding 
authority over children. The hijab, in contrast, is worn by individual girls and 
women, and disputes arise when the state seeks to restrict it. The court might 
reasonably see a teacher with a headscarf as a more complex case, requiring a 
balanced consideration of her two aspects as both an individual believer and a 
state agent with authority over children. It might further highlight the intersec-
tion of gender discrimination and religious discrimination at play when the 
state excludes Muslim minority girls or women from schools for conforming to 
religious norms, impairing their right to education or work. 
The ECtHR, however, has done the opposite. In Lautsi and others v. Italy 
(ECtHR, 2011), it ultimately upheld Italy’s Fascist-era decrees mandating the 
display of crucifixes in public schools; in Dogru v. France (ECtHR, 2008), it 
upheld the expulsion of a schoolgirl for wearing a headscarf; and in Dahlab 
v. Switzerland (ECtHR, 2001), the case of a teacher prohibited from wearing 
a headscarf while teaching, it simply dismissed her application as unfounded. 
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This paradox is mostly explained by the court’s deference to state au-
thorities in religious matters (states’ ‘margin of appreciation’) and the difficulty 
of developing a consistent European jurisprudence on religion when states have 
markedly different traditions of secularism and state-church relations. How-
ever, to justify their decisions, both national and international authorities have 
also resorted to contrived interpretations of religious symbols. 
In Lautsi, the Italian Administrative Court went to the astonishing 
lengths of arguing that the crucifix actually symbolised secularism (for a de-
tailed critique, see Gedicks & Annicchino, 2013). It held that the modern no-
tions of tolerance and liberties were historically linked to a Christian emphasis 
on ‘charity over faith’ and ‘rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar’s’. Though the 
link was non-obvious, like an underground stream, the court was able to iden-
tify such principles, even religious freedom, in the ‘central core of Christian 
faith’. All religious convictions were inherently exclusive except one – Christi-
anity ‘as properly understood’. Besides national identity, the crucifix thus also 
symbolised ‘liberty, equality, human rights and religious toleration, and [...] the 
secular nature of the State’. It should be affirmed in order to transmit ‘the refusal 
of any form of fundamentalism’ to ‘numerous pupils from outside the European 
Union’ (probably meaning Muslims and stereotyping them as prone to ‘funda-
mentalism’). Therefore, it would be ‘something of a paradox’ to exclude it from 
a public institution in the name of secularism (Administrative Court, quoted 
in ECtHR, 2011, para. 15). On appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court held 
that the crucifix symbolised ‘the religious origin of ’ values which ‘characterise 
Italian civilisation’ (tolerance, rights, etc.) without detracting from their secu-
lar value, which could be affirmed by all. The crucifix could, therefore, fulfil ‘a 
highly educational symbolic function, irrespective of the religion professed by 
the pupils’ (Consiglio di Stato, quoted in ECtHR, 2011, para. 16). 
The final ECtHR judgement considered the crucifix ‘above all a religious 
symbol’ and wisely avoided further interpretations, except to call it ‘an essentially 
passive symbol’ (ECtHR, 2011, para. 72). In the Dahlab case, however, the same 
court had argued that a headscarf could be a ‘powerful external symbol’ with a 
proselytising effect on young children (ECtHR, 2001). What made a crucifix on a 
classroom wall ‘passive’ and a headscarf on a teacher’s head ‘powerful’? The ECtHR 
sought to dismiss the contradiction by saying the facts of the two cases were en-
tirely different (2011, para. 73), without explaining how the difference was relevant. 
Observations of similar court cases on religion, and of the ‘murky mix-
ture’ of arguments about religious symbols that inform judges’ decisions, have 
led some to declare ‘the impossibility of religious freedom’ as a justiciable legal 
right (Sullivan, 2005, esp. pp. 5–8). 
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Teachable controversies 
Unlike Sullivan, I am optimistic that religious freedom can be meaning-
fully protected by liberal democracies through knowledge-based state regula-
tion of religious practice and identity. However, as conflicts in this area involve 
essentially contested concepts and ‘thick doctrines’, in modern plural societies 
they are better seen as tensions to manage and learn from than as problems to 
solve once and for all.9 They can serve as ‘teachable controversies’:10 studying 
and discussing such conflicts is a democratic exercise. While this can be done in 
Citizenship classes, an RE framework allows exploring the religious convictions 
behind the symbols as well as the classifications that guide policy (religious/
secular, sacred/profane). This can be a learning experience both for pupils and 
for the educators who are first in line to manage the issues when they arise. In 
the following, I outline discussion topics reflecting the strengths of SR-based 
RE as a laboratory for analysing religious-symbol issues. 
Interpreting ambiguity, assessing authority 
SR training helps resist the trap of reducing symbols to any one authori-
tative meaning. Religious symbols tend to be highly multivocal or polysemous 
(Turner, 1967, p. 50): they can stand for multiple, seemingly contradictory 
meanings, which can also emerge and change over time. For example, there 
is a traditional Islamic legal discourse that explains hijab in terms of women’s 
duty to avoid arousing male passions and causing seduction/social strife (fitna), 
and a modern Muslim women’s discourse of the hijab as an individual right, a 
personal choice, an expression of their Muslim identity and a protection against 
harassment; today, these discourses co-exist uneasily (see, e.g., Mir-Hosseini, 
2007). Even the notion that the crucifix could stand for secularism should not 
be dismissed out of hand. However, some interpretations are more plausible 
than others, for example, in terms of being supported by contextual evidence. 
Religious symbols are not interpreted in a vacuum, but with reference to 
context and to the relevant interpretive communities (Scharffs, 2012), which in 
turn adhere to established interpretive authorities and meanings. All of these, 
9 Rules are needed, of course, but on this view, rules should not be fixed in national law; rather, they 
should be made on lower administrative levels; be subject to review in the light of experience; em-
power headmasters to experiment with compromises; and provide for processes of negotiation. 
An example of the latter is the Bavarian compromise that crucifixes may be displayed, but that 
parents can contest the display locally (ECtHR, 2011, para. 28, p. 13).
10 ‘Teach the controversy’ is a slogan notoriously used by creationists and global-warming deniers, 
to cast doubt on settled science. It nevertheless seems an appropriate motto for conflicts over re-
ligious symbols, where not only policy choices but the symbolic meanings themselves are bound 
up with contested values.
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however, may be plural and divergent in a given case. It is, therefore, essential 
to understand different traditions’ authority structures and interpretive methods. 
There are practical limits to how far this diversity can be covered in RE, but it 
should be conveyed, for example. that Islam has no pope or central teaching 
authority; it has scholars, aligned with various traditional schools of thought, 
who derive religious norms from a widely agreed set of sources and methods 
but differ over many details and the importance placed on them. The student of 
Islam therefore quickly learns to ask ‘Whose Islam?’ and not to take the opinion 
of any one Muslim authority as dispositive for all Muslims, for example, as to 
whether a particular form of covering (niqab, burqa) is a religious requirement. 
Comparison and classification: religious symbols 
SR-based RE helps place symbols and policies toward them into a com-
parative perspective. Comparison, as well as the companion issue of classifica-
tion, is a long-standing concern in SR, from the ethnographic miscellanies of 
early anthropologists through the phenomenology of religion to recent meth-
odological reflections that have been sharpened by post-modernist and politi-
cal critiques (Carter, 2004; Patton & Ray, 2000; Smith, 1982). RE often features 
units devoted to particular phenomena across religious traditions, such as pil-
grimage, holy books, mystical experience or dietary rules. This thematic ap-
proach trains students to consider similar features in different religions and 
world-views, while the systematic approach to each religious tradition as a unit 
provides a check on the aptness of such comparisons. 
Exploring hijabs and crosses in the classroom, one might start from pu-
pils’ own experience of how people express their identities through clothing 
and fashion: what one can tell from their attire, haircuts, and accessories.11 One 
might go on to discuss other religious headgear (nun’s habits, kippas, turbans), 
in what contexts religious people cover and uncover their heads, what the sym-
bolism is, and whether there are also secular public rituals and symbols of a 
similar nature, for example, in the army or courtroom. (For a classic discussion 
along these lines, see Hallpike, 1969/1979.)
Such comparisons lead to analysis in terms of critical categories like ‘the 
sacred’ or ‘gender’, revealing differences between the symbols themselves that 
may or may not justify different treatment. For instance, the cross (and in some 
churches, the crucifix) is instantly recognisable not just as a Christian sym-
bol, but as the symbol emblematic of the religion as a whole, much like a flag 
stands for the nation – a ‘summarizing symbol’ (Ortner, 1973/1979). Crucifixes 
and crosses are considered sacred items, used for ritual purposes and centrally 
11 Preferably without putting minority students in the class on the spot as exemplars of their religion.
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displayed in churches. However, the cross also features in secular contexts (e.g., 
medical signs). It may be casually worn (by both sexes) in any situation both as 
an expression of piety and as a profane ornament. The headscarf, in contrast, 
is a piece of cloth with no intrinsic sanctity. It is worn only by women, and 
Muslims widely consider it a religious duty for women to be covered in the 
company of men who are not closely related to them. Such a gendered expres-
sion of sexual modesty grounded in religious morality is also at stake in other 
public-school issues (swimming, handshakes). Since the ‘Islamic awakening’ 
of the 1970s, the hijab has taken on a range of meanings, including political 
ones, and the hijab-clad woman has become a symbol of Islam. Conversely, the 
kippa is worn as a religious duty by male Jews, and the turban mostly but not 
exclusively by male Sikhs (whose religious duty centres on the unshorn hair it 
covers). All of these symbols can express a person’s piety and devotion, as well 
as their affiliation to a community set apart from others. 
After this analysis, one can return to the issue of school dress codes with 
a better idea of the different stated and unstated reasons people might have for 
displaying religious symbols and reacting to their regulation. Considering sex-
ual modesty, pupils might reflect on how they would feel if a school dress code 
required them to expose themselves indecently by Western cultural standards; 
considering identity, they might consider whether banning such items might 
cause more young people to wear them as a ‘punk’ sign of protest. 
Comparison and classification: Regulating religion 
Another line of comparison, requiring more specialised historical back-
ground knowledge, is how state authority in other times and places has treated 
the religious symbols of others, and how these policies have shaped public 
space. What are the similarities and differences between hijab laws in Iran, Tur-
key, and France? How do they compare with the ‘hat laws’ introduced in Turkey 
and Iran in the early 20th century? More generally, can we find points of com-
parison between today’s secular toleration policies and very different regimes, 
like the Roman state’s toleration of cults that venerated the Emperor, or the late 
Ottoman millet system? How do laïcist public dress codes that compel minori-
ties to hide religious difference, compare with those in medieval Christendom 
and Islam that compelled religious minorities to mark their difference visibly 
(e.g., ‘Jewish badges’)? 
Debates on the regulation of religious symbols often turn on broad clas-
sifications. As seen in the Lautsi case, it is often asserted that, for example, a 
crucifix is acceptable in classrooms because it should be understood as a cultur-
al symbol, conventional in the majority culture, and not as an object of religious 
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veneration; therefore, the argument goes, it does not infringe on the separation 
between state and religion. A variety of similar, strategically inflected argu-
ments may be brought to bear on other people’s symbols: The Muslim head-
scarf can variously be portrayed as religious (and thus unacceptable in secular 
schools); as a cultural tradition (hence not protected by religious freedom), or 
as primarily a political statement (more often to paint it as a dangerous chal-
lenge to the Western constitutional order than to afford it protection under 
freedom of expression). 
To assess these arguments, it is helpful to recall that symbols have multi-
ple meanings, so they can belong to several spheres at once. Religion has often 
served as a source of political legitimacy as well as a medium for propagating 
political messages and a collective identity that can be mobilised for political 
ends. It is also helpful to recall the SR understanding of religion as a social and 
cultural phenomenon: there is no religious symbol that is not cultural. The con-
verse is not true: we can and do classify cultural elements and social practices 
as religious or not (otherwise SR could not exist). Indeed, the differentiation 
of religion as a social subsystem is a key element of modernisation (e.g., Beyer, 
1994). However, if the social dynamics of religion can be studied and accounted 
for by similar methods and theories as profane social phenomena (e.g., fashion, 
ethno-nationalism, etc.), distinctions between ‘pure’ religion and culture/soci-
ety/politics may be seen less as analytical tools than as social constructions to 
be analysed. 
Critical reading and thinking skills 
By advocating RE as training in critical thinking, I do not mean to ad-
vocate a pedagogical approach that focuses on propositional reasoning about 
ethics or religious philosophy from or through religion. Instead, I think primar-
ily of teaching pupils to apply source criticism and to identify and mitigate cog-
nitive biases and fallacious modes of reasoning when learning about religion.
As an illustration, consider the courts’ reasoning in Lautsi. To identify 
Christianity with religious freedom and tolerance, the Italian court had to ex-
clude much historical evidence ad hoc from the ‘core’ of Christianity as ‘prop-
erly understood’, thus committing the ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy. The court’s ex-
ceptionalist claim for Christianity as uniquely non-exclusionary makes highly 
selective use of religious texts (‘charity above faith’, ‘render unto Caesar’). It also 
exhibits the fallacy of religious congruence (Chaves, 2010) or scriptural deter-
minism (Appiah, 2018): the empirically ill-supported assumption that believers’ 
behaviour will accord with their beliefs and texts. In short, the court identified 
its in-group (Italian Christian civilisation) with uniquely positive values and 
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virtues by resorting to special pleading. Training in SR sensitises students to 
such special pleading about religion.
This is in part because SR-based RE adds a dimension to the source criti-
cism that is already taught, for example, in History classes. SR is also concerned 
with what people have believed happened in the far past and what it has meant 
to them, not only with what actually happened. That is, it is concerned with the 
second-order hermeneutics of understanding religious interpretations of the 
religious sources, not only with interpreting those sources themselves. More-
over, due to its comparative bent, SR has greatly concerned itself with peoples 
distant in space, culture and power from the researcher, and has had to reflect 
on its role and biases in representing others (e.g., in response to Said, 1978/1995).
Nuancing the secular 
SR offers analytical and historical insight into the religious and the 
secular, secularisation, and secularism. With regard to secularisation, pupils 
can learn that while sociologists had long expected religiosity to decline in the 
modern world, developments in the last few decades have called secularisa-
tion theory into question (e.g., Berger, 1999), and that more careful distinctions 
have lately been drawn, for example, between secularisation as decline, differ-
entiation, and privatisation (Casanova, 1994), or between religiosity as believ-
ing or belonging (Davie, 1994). In this perspective, one may discuss whether 
the hijab-as-women’s-right and crucifix-as-secularism arguments represent a 
remarkable, ironic secularisation, or a re-assertion of religion as collective and 
public identity. 
With regard to secularism, pupils can learn to distinguish between sec-
ularism as the institutional neutrality of the state towards the religions of its 
citizens, and secularism as laïcism, a thicker ideology requiring the religious 
neutrality of citizens in their relations with the state (as well as vigilant state 
control of religious expression). They should be aware that notionally secular 
European states differ widely in their approaches to religion, from laïcism to 
state religions (established churches) with accommodations for other religions, 
and they should be able to apply this knowledge, for example, to the widely dif-
fering approaches of the UK and France to religious dress in school. 
Pupils might also learn about a third option mediating between state 
religion and state irreligion, namely ‘civil religion’, a ‘sui generis hybrid of reli-
gion and national communality’ that is ‘intricately intertwined with national-
ism’ (Hvithamar, Warburg, & Jacobsen, 2009, p. 5). First suggested by Rousseau 
as a ‘purely civil profession of faith’ that governments should impose to make 
loyal, law-abiding citizens (Rousseau, 1999, pp. 166–168), a civil religion has 
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been identified in American public speeches and ceremonies (Bellah, 1967), 
and in a variety of other contexts. When public authorities use religion to foster 
national cohesion and tolerance – whether in the form of common symbols and 
rituals or in the form of a specific kind of RE – the question arises whether they 
are promoting a form of civil religion rather than a non-confessional education. 
Discussion
Educators can respond to controversy over religious symbols in schools 
by ‘teaching the controversy’ through RE, drawing on the resources of the sci-
entific Study of Religion as outlined above with reference to the Lautsi and 
headscarf cases. The concern with national cohesion that is driving the contro-
versies represents both an opportunity and a challenge for SR-based RE.
The opportunity is a clear imperative for ‘integrative’ RE about differ-
ent religions taught to all pupils the same way. Religion is widely conflated 
with morality, and migrant identities with religion, which makes RE prone to 
becoming the designated ‘values-and-integration subject’. Indeed, RE can be 
made to integrate students into ‘national values’, whether understood as a cul-
tural identity and its religious tradition(s), a set of democratic-secular values, 
or a mix of both. This is a temptation for policy-makers both on the right and 
the left. The challenge, then, is that RE may be geared more to ‘integration’ than 
education. 
The politics of immigration after the 2015 ‘surge’, the securitisation of 
immigrants’ religion and the rise of populist nationalism will likely continue 
to reinforce pressures both to police the display of minority religious symbols 
and to use RE to promote ‘integration’ through ‘national values’ and prevent 
‘extremism’. This will not necessarily take the blatant form of a nativist demand 
that immigrants assimilate to the majority religion. Instead, it may take the 
form of a subject heavily geared towards teaching, for example, gender equality 
or other civic values that immigrants are supposed to lack. It might not result in 
a wholesale revision of RE, as in 1990s Norway, but instead come as piecemeal 
programmes and requirements, such as the teaching standards introduced in 
the UK in the early 2010s that require teachers to promote ‘Fundamental British 
Values’ (see criticism in Richardson, 2015; Farrell, 2016), or the increased stress 
on Christianity in Denmark (Fernández & Jensen, 2017). 
I suggest, however, that an overemphasis on shared values and identity 
would be detrimental to the kind of RE that I have discussed here. First, given 
finite time and resources, a strong emphasis on values will come at the expense 
of learning about other religions. This trade-off is too easily ignored due to the 
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widespread failure to recognise religion as a field of knowledge (as opposed to 
moral sentiment, existential wonder, and subjective experience). Second, an over-
emphasis on imparting values rather than exposing students to a range of values 
and ideas would detract from the subject’s mission of fostering critical enquiry. 
This holds whether the values in question are liberal, national, or confessional.
Third, to use RE to integrate pupils into a shared, approved worldview is 
to miss the unique qualities SR-based RE can bring to education. SR has evolved 
as a comparative discipline that ultimately takes different human worlds of 
meaning as its subject of comparison. Like few other academic disciplines, SR 
has the knack of ‘making the familiar strange and the strange familiar’ (Muesse, 
1999; cf. Smith, 2004, p. 389). By doing so, it offers students a chance to dis-
integrate themselves from their cultural matrix and to look at their own society 
and culture from new vantage points before re-integrating these insights within 
an academic framework. The above discussion offers several examples of such 
perspective shifts.
‘By reflecting upon the most comprehensive constructions of the world’s 
order, one cannot escape an impression of the historically contingent charac-
ter of all worlds, including one’s own’, Jaffee notes in the paper cited in the in-
troduction. Accordingly, he sees his university classroom as ‘a place to model 
a theoretically articulate pluralism regarding the cultural definition of Truth’, 
including ‘the moral consequences and rhetorical dimensions of the very theo-
retical positions which enable our perspective’ (Jaffee, 1999, p. 280). 
Within the constraints of a school subject, RE can perform a similar 
service for children. If it is too concerned with fostering shared identity and 
values, however, it not only risks encroaching on religious freedom, as in the 
Norwegian case, and further alienating the minorities it is meant to integrate. It 
also misses its chance to give majority pupils insight into other people’s worlds 
and an outside perspective on their own.
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